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Received approaches to a unified phenomenon called “language” are firmly committed
to a Cartesian view of distinct unobservable minds. Questioning this commitment leads
us to recognize that the boundaries conventionally separating the linguistic from the
non-linguistic can appear arbitrary, omitting much that is regularly present during vocal
communication. The thesis is put forward that uttering, or voicing, is a much older
phenomenon than the formal structures studied by the linguist, and that the voice has
found elaborations and codifications in other domains too, such as in systems of ritual
and rite. Voice, it is suggested, necessarily gives rise to a temporally bound subjectivity,
whether it is in inner speech (Descartes’ “cogito”), in conversation, or in the synchronized
utterances of collective speech found in prayer, protest, and sports arenas world wide. The
notion of a fleeting subjective pole tied to dynamically entwined participants who exert
reciprocal influence upon each other in real time provides an insightful way to understand
notions of common ground, or socially shared cognition. It suggests that the remarkable
capacity to construct a shared world that is so characteristic of Homo sapiens may be
grounded in this ability to become dynamically entangled as seen, e.g., in the centrality
of joint attention in human interaction. Empirical evidence of dynamic entanglement in
joint speaking is found in behavioral and neuroimaging studies. A convergent theoretical
vocabulary is now available in the concept of participatory sense-making, leading to the
development of a rich scientific agenda liberated from a stifling metaphysics that obscures,
rather than illuminates, the means by which we come to inhabit a shared world.
Keywords: joint speech, participatory sense-making, intersubjectivity, dynamic entwining, chant
1. INTRODUCTION
We speak with confidence of something called “language,” as if
this term referred to a single system, capable of multiple forms of
manifestation (writing, speech, signing), but unified by organized
structures and processes in the formal domains of phonology,
morphology, syntax, and semantics. This emphasis on systematic-
ity and symbolic encoding has utterly dominated the scientific
view of “language” at least since the structuralist innovations
of Saussure (1959/1916), and has been greatly reinforced by the
pivotal role of generative linguistics in the birth of the cogni-
tivist account of mind as a form of symbol-based information
processing (Fodor, 1975). In the context of inter-personal com-
munication, language, on this view, serves as a form of message
passing, whereby ideas conceived in the mind of one person are
encoded, first into words, and then into movements of mouth or
hand, at which point they become transmittable to another, who
sets about decoding them, thereby gaining access to the ideas of
the sender. The message passing perspective on language is com-
pelling, powerful, and supported by a host of technologies, from
the very first forms of writing to the most sophisticated of digital
platforms.
The emphasis on symbols and systematicity allows the iden-
tification of a tentative boundary between the linguistic and the
non-linguistic. For example, a conventional distinction is drawn
between phonological and non-phonological characteristics of
the sounds of speech. Roughly, those features that support the
identification of discrete categories such as phonemes, are taken
as indices of linguistic structure, while non-categorical and con-
tinuously varying features such as the loudness of a voice would
lie beyond the notional bounds of language proper. Once discrete
entities belonging to non-overlapping categories are available,
they can be combined into larger symbolic structures, from
syllables to novels.
Language thus appears to be a clearly delineated and unified
phenomenon, of which one can meaningfully construct theories.
This leads to a compelling observation that there seems to be a
yawning chasm between the many kinds of communication sys-
tems found in animals and the generative, creative richness found
in every human language. And so the foundations are laid for the
perplexing observation that language seems to have appeared not
so very long ago in an evolutionary timescale, and to have imme-
diately enabled the development of the whole of human culture,
technology, and all the institutions of all societies.
Two related observations will serve to provide us here with a
slightly different view of “language.” The first is that the above
story is fundamentally committed to an ontological split between
mind and world. If we accept such a split, then meanings or ideas
belong firmly in the realm of the mental, and they find expression
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indifferently in writing or speech, each of which provides a kind
of physical container for the passing of ideas from one mind
to the next. The second observation is that the traditional story
enforces a somewhat arbitrary divide between the linguistic and
non-linguistic, motivated by the desire to ensure that language is
systematic and supports the kind of symbolic operations familiar
from syntax and related disciplines. If we observe communica-
tion among people, we see many aspects to that behavior that
never feature in linguistic theory, and that nevertheless seem to be
reliably and essentially associated with inter-personal communi-
cation. These two observations are related, because if we consider
alternatives to the Cartesian mind/world split that divides ideas
and meanings from sounds and movements, the apparent signifi-
cance of many of the behaviors and features reliably and regularly
attending communication may change, and with that, the bound-
aries of “language” may shift, or, indeed, fragment, to reveal a
variety of phenomena that do not admit of a single systematic
description.
I will argue that the way in which we conventionally treat
of the phenomenon called “language” is overly restrictive, and
seems more appropriate to the characterization of writing than
speaking/listening (Linell, 2005). Older than writing by far is the
voice, and the voice has remarkable properties all of its own. Chief
among these is the obligatory association between the voice and a
transient subject-pole that grounds intentionality. This, it seems
to me, may be part of the reason the inner voice seems to be
inextricably associated with the Cartesian subject. To develop this
notion, I will turn to the substantive domain of joint, or collective,
speaking, showing how collective speech engenders a different
kind of subject, displaying collective intentionality. Furthermore,
just as the voice of the individual admitted of development and
codification in writing, so collective speaking admitted of devel-
opment and codification in practices of liturgy and ritual. Written
language, which is the more accurate target of modern linguis-
tics, is thus not the only descendent of voice. The empirical study
of collective speaking is in its infancy, but it reveals emergent
phenomena that arise only in the real time reciprocal interac-
tion of speakers speaking in unison. These emergent phenomena
add substance to the argument that the traditional depiction of
language as message passing mischaracterizes, or omits, much
of what is going on in vocal communication (Cowley and Love,
2006). It neglects the fluid intertwining of subjectivities that
arises in real time reciprocal interaction, and that appears clearly
in joint speaking. This only becomes apparent if we approach
languaging (rather than language) as a set of multi-faceted
behaviors that defy characterization from a single metaphysical
viewpoint1.
2. REVISITING DESCARTES
Let us fancifully drop in on Descartes as he deduces his own exis-
tence. The statement “Cogito, ergo sum” is without doubt the
most famous line in Western Philosophy, and the basic outline of
1A complementary account of languaging from an enactive perspective is
provided in Bottineau (2010). This account adheres to a more conventional
view of what the domain of language is than adopted here, but many of the
fundamental concerns raised therein resonate with the themes of this article.
the argument underlying it is overly familiar 2. A skeptical philoso-
pher, wishing to establish a foundation for true and certain
knowledge, recognizes that the world of appearances, mediated
by the senses may be illusory. He considers what remains after
denying the testimony of the senses, and reasons thus:
So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally
conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true
whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind
(Meditation 2, AT 7:25).
The “I” that is invoked here is explicitly and emphatically not a
body, but a mind (7:27). The split between mind and world is
absolute. Irrespective of how the consequences are played out,
Descartes’ certainty has become the split we have failed to dis-
tance our selves from. Substance dualism narrowly conceived is,
of course, not a respectable metaphysical position any more, but
the split that is effected here between mind and world, and at
the same time, between metaphysics and epistemology, far from
being overcome, has become the foundational assumption upon
which the whole of psychology (and more) has been built. As
Sheets-Johnstone put it, it has become “a lexical band-aid cov-
ering a 350-year-old wound generated and kept suppurating by a
schizoid metaphysics” (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, p. 275).
But what is going on for Descartes? There is a voice. Whether
it is a voice speaking in Latin “Cogito, ergo sum!,” or a voice
speaking in French “Je suis, j’existe!,” it is a (silent) utterance—a
thought in the form of words. Without language (better: lan-
guaging), there is no such thought. Without a culturally specific
history of vocal interaction among people during whichmeanings
and uses of language emerge, there is no such voice. The solipsis-
tic prison of Descartes’ fancy is not so devoid of other people as
he seems to believe, for in harboring the voice that can utter the
“Cogito!,” it is populated by the practice of Latin, or the practice
of French. Closing the eyes does not keep out the world, and it
does not keep out other people.
The inner voice of linguistic thought that speaks here “to”
Descartes is not different in kind from the outer voice of overt
speech. Indeed, the whole metaphorical quagmire associated with
the use of the terms inner and outer stems from the very confu-
sion I wish to here circumvent. Vygotsky has presented a thorough
argument that the overt but self-directed speech of young chil-
dren is, firstly, a specialization of intersubjective social speech, and
secondly, is the precursor to inner speech, or linguistic thought
(Vygotsky, 1986). This insight provides us with an understanding
of continuity between overt speech and silent speech, or linguistic
thought.
What if we choose to interpret Descartes’ predicament some-
what differently? Instead of considering the voice as evidence of
a pre-existing subject, we might consider it to give rise to a tran-
sient subjecthood. We cannot understand the occurrent thought
as an utterance in the message-passing sense, as there are not two
distinct domains, a speaker and a listener, for any message to be
passed among. But we are now entertaining the tentative notion
2The famous Latin phrase does not appear in the Second Meditation, where
the original argument is most clearly made.
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that there is no Cartesian subject before the occurrence of the
thought, and so any subjecthood associated with this utterance
arises with the utterance and fades thereafter. This is not a fully
fledged psychological subject, equipped with the mechanisms of
“cognitive systems”; it is a subject-pole that allows a distinction
between subject and world, or self and other, to be discerned,
and that supports or invites the ascription of intentionality. It is
a transient orientation, tied to the real time unfolding of the lin-
guistic thought itself (“. . . whenever it is put forward by me or
conceived in my mind.”). Later in the 2nd Meditation, Descartes
himself seems to concur with this association of the Subject with
the transient inner voice when he says “I am, I exist—that is
certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For
it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should
totally cease to exist” (Meditation 2, AT 7:27). Now the nature
of “thinking” has not been generaly agreed upon, but the form
of thinking Descartes here alludes to is clearly the utterance of an
inner voice, in specific words, words which he is capable of repeat-
ing to us, words which we can characterize as Latin or French. I
wish to pursue this idea, that voice gives rise to the complemen-
tarity between the poles of subject and world, and it does so in
real time.
3. VOICES AND SUBJECTS
[V]oice is a kind of sound of an ensouled thing. For none of the
things without soul gives voice, though some are said by analogy
to give voice, such as the flute and the lyre and whatever other of
the things without soul have the production of sustained, varied
and articulate sound. For voice also has these features and so there
is a likeness (Aristotle, 1986, 420b, p. 178).
The association between the animate (even ensouled) subject and
the voice is ancient. In Connor (2000) the long history of the sub-
jects perceived as being behind voices emanating from unlikely
places is recounted in detail. From the Delphic oracle through
the medieval fascination with demonic possession, prophecy, and
divine inspiration, voices perceived as coming from the stomach,
the genitals, or even a crack in the rock have been enthusiastically
attributed to invisible subjects, rather than to sound-producing
properties of either inanimate objects or of atypical parts of the
body itself. Much of the ghoulish fascination that the ventril-
oquist’s dummy attracts lies in the obligatory projection of a
subject behind the grotesque appearance. Connor writes:
For I produce my voice in a way that I do not produce these other
attributes [eyes, hair, gait, fingerprints, etc]. . . . giving voice is
the process which simultaneously produces articulate sound, and
produces myself, as a self-producing being (Connor, 2000, p. 3).
It is telling that the words uttered in one of the very earliest sound
recordings, made by Alexander Graham Bell in 1881, are “T-r-r—
T-r-r—There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio, than
are dreamed of in our philosophy—T-r-r—I am a Graphophone
and my mother was a Phonograph” (Volta Laboratory, 2013,
Emphasis added), thus instinctively investing one of the very first
disembodied voices born of technology with subjecthood of its
own. Remarkably, the telephone and the phonograph came into
being almost simultaneously—in 1876, 1877. Add to these the
advent of radio transmission of the human voice, first done in
1900 in Brazil, and it is clear that we have been awash in disem-
bodied voices for over a 100 years and counting. The irritating
proliferation of pseudo-personalities such as the iPhone’s Siri
seems likely to continue.
If the voice Descartes conjures up alone generates a subjectivity
that is aligned with the classic subject-object distinction at the
level of the single individual, then we might give consideration
to the possibility that voice employed in different circumstances
might generate other forms of subjectivity, without commitment
to individual Cartesian minds.
3.1. SHARED SUBJECTIVITY AND COMMON GROUND
When an utterance is made in a specific context with speaker and
listener both present, it is interpreted in the light of the shared
understanding of all parties. This has found expression in theo-
retical notions of common ground (Clark and Brennan, 1991), or
socially shared cognition (Schegloff, 1991). Most developments
of the idea of common ground are couched within the informa-
tion processing/message passing framework, and therefore make
use of some version of aligned or shared representational content.
However, it is not necessary to appeal to such unobservable con-
structs from a hidden Cartesian world (Hutto and Myin, 2013).
There is ample evidence that participants in a conversational
exchange become mutually linked in many subtle but observ-
able ways. Eye movements (Richardson et al., 2007), postural
sway (Shockley et al., 2009), and even blinking (Cummins, 2012)
have all been found to become subtly intertwined in conversation,
leading to a dynamic entanglement of the participants. Speakers
and listeners are further linked through the provision by the latter
of signals of ongoing engagement through postural, gestural, and
vocal indices or backchannels (Wagner et al., 2014).
The yoking together of two or more people engaging in lan-
guage behavior establishes a common basis from which the par-
ticipants confront the world. It makes available a shared frame-
work within which statements can be interpreted. It thus provides
a scaffold for shared intentionality (Carr, 1987). The ability to
share an intentional perspecitive seems to be at the very heart
of human language use, but it is not an all or nothing affair.
Two protesters with common purpose who chant the same slogan
demonstrate an extreme alignment with respect to the world. But
two people engaged in heated disagreement must still achieve a
great deal of alignment in order to disagree felicitously. The topic
of disagreement must be foregrounded, at the expense of every-
thing else. In disputing causal chains, in laying out competing
sequences of events, and in presenting different interpretations
of the significance of actions and events, two disputants are nec-
essarily sharing a great deal of background framing, picking out
these events rather than those, identifying the same actors, while
quarreling over their respective roles. Even in the absence of
conversational exchange, people observing the same scene exert
reciprocal influence on one another, such that their gaze behav-
ior, and by inference, the details they pay attention to, become
inter-dependent. In a series of experiments summarized in Dale
et al. (2013) gaze behavior of subjects are demonstrated to depend
sensitively on the presence of others, and on whether one subject
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knows or believes that the others are seeing and hearing the same
things as they are.
If joint languaging provides a very powerful example of inten-
tional alignment, then it might be that that the ability to coordi-
nate the manner in which we jointly pay attention to the world is
an important skill that facilitated the emergence of such behavior,
as argued in Fusaroli and Tylén (2012). Sometime between the
last speciation event some 5 or 6 million years ago that gave rise
to chimpanzees and bonobos on the one hand, and the hominid
line on the other, something happened that had profound con-
sequences for our ability to share perspectives and to coordinate
with one another. There is one small biological change that we
know occurred in that time, that might play a significant role
here. That change gave rise to the white sclera of the human eye
that contrasts vividly with the darker iris, thus providing a very
clean signal of the direction of gaze of a partner (Tomasello et al.,
2007). The other great apes do not have such a contrast, and their
ability to align their gaze is severely limited, and based on head
direction rather than the eyes—although chimpanzees and bono-
bos in particular do display some evidence of understanding the
visual perspective of another (Okamoto-Barth et al., 2007). The
ability to follow each other’s gaze thus facilitates the sharing of
attention, and has been demonstrated to structure mother-child
interactions, while inducing the abilty to take part in languaging
(Tomasello and Farrar, 1986).
As common ground is established, the subjective point from
which utterances are spoken also shifts. Vygotsky has pointed out
how the (linguistic) subject becomes an implied, rather than an
overt, element in speech once common understanding has been
established (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236). For example, it would be odd
to respond to the question “Would you like a cup of tea?” with
the answer “No, I don’t want a cup of tea,” instead of simply “No.”
Similarly, a group of people waiting for a bus establishes suffi-
cient shared context that no one is likely to point out the obvious
and say “The bus for which we are waiting is coming,” but simply
“coming” or some such expression. The dropping of the linguistic
subject is more extensive yet in inner speech, of which Vygotsky
says “it is as much a law of inner speech to omit subjects as it is
a law of written speech to contain both subjects and predicates”
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. 243). Many languages allow dropping of any
explicit mention of the subject once they can be inferred on prag-
matic grounds. This is not merely a syntactic quirk of one group
of languages, as it is found in such typologically distant languages
as Japanese, Chinese, Turkish, and Spanish (Huang, 1984).
It would be a mistake to simply equate the subject pole of
a subject-world complementary pair with the syntactic subject,
but it would be inexcusable too to ignore the deep link between
the fundamental linguistic structure of subject and predicate on
the one hand and the subjective pole from which utterances are
brought forth on the other. The subject pole that arises in the
unfolding of the voice grounds intentionality, and provides an
anchoring point for reference. This is, perhaps, most explicit in
the manner in which deixis functions, allowing use of terms such
as “there,” “here,” “then,” “now,” whose meaning is anchored in
the joint situation created by conversational participants; It is
also explicit in the manner in which the first personal pronouns,
both singular and plural, find flexible, and context-specific use.
It is implicit too in establishing a shared register and perspective
within which meaning is negotiated. The differentiation of sub-
ject and world, and the ability to establish a shared perspective
within which utterances function, precedes any overt syntactic
knowledge or awareness by millennia (Olson, 1996).
3.2. ALIGNMENT vs. SYNERGY
The dynamic intertwining of conversational participants interact-
ing in real time has not gone unnoticed. An influential approach
to account for the many overt and subtle ways in which two inter-
locutors become linked is found in the Interactive Alignment
model of Pickering and Garrod (2004, 2014). This model seeks
to describe the tendency for conversational partners to imi-
tate one another at a variety of levels, from syntactic biasing,
through lexical selection, down to the level of phonetic, and
gestural imitation. The idea that similarity in one domain can
unconsciously bleed through representational levels to generate
similarity in other domains provides some explanatory purchase
on a great deal of corpus-based data. As a general account
of the dynamic coupling and mutual accommodation found
among speaker/listeners, however, it is somewhat limited. It leaves
language resolutely within the heads of individual conversing
partners, and this does not move beyond the Cartesian, represen-
tationalist framework. It is “representation-hungry,” demanding
computational representations at many levels, and indeed, in its
most recent form, it conjures up a baroque series of simula-
tions inside the heads of individuals who must not only act, but
also predict the actions of others (Pickering and Garrod, 2014).
This approach does not generalize in any obvious way to multi-
party conversations. Nor does it account for coupling among
interactants that are not strictly imitative in nature, as with the
mutual influence exerted on blinks (Cummins, 2012). The ten-
dency to alignment suggests that felicitous conversation would
result in mere mimicry, which is again not what we observe, and
it privileges similarity, at the expense of complementarity, thereby
missing the fundamental role-based nature of conversation in
which the positions of speaker and listener alternate.
A competing account has recently been proposed that regards
inter-personal coordination in dialog as a form of synergy or
dynamical coupling (Fusaroli et al., 2014). This approach is
rooted in dynamical approaches to coordination that are level-
agnostic, seeking to understand emergent phenomena at one level
(e.g., the dyad) as arising through processes of self-organization
from the constrained interaction of autonomous components at
a lower level (the speaker/listeners) (Kelso, 1995; Latash, 2008).
This approach highlights the sensitivity of participants to real
time recurrent interaction, as is evident even in the early inter-
actions of infants and mothers (Murray and Trevarthen, 1986).
It emphasizes the intertwining of the movements of participants,
leading to dimensional reduction, so that two interacting per-
sons become, temporarily, a simpler collective entity than the
two persons considered as a mere conjunction of individuals.
It acknowledges both synchronized and complementary actions
as they contribute to this simplification, and it emphasizes the
manner in which shared understanding of task constraints leads
to stability of patterning in time. Although still somewhat spec-
ulative, this level-independent approach seems commensurate
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with the approach to be developed here that treats groups of
people as synergetically organized domains in their own right,
with respect to which subjectivities of a collective nature can be
identified.
Synergistic approaches to human communication have been
argued for by others. Thibault (2011) adopts a position not unlike
the present one in which a fundamental distinction is drawn
between what he calls talk and text. The role of voice described
both here and in his work emphasizes the bodily entrainment
that arises at a very fine scale among interactants, while the prop-
erties that linguists conventionally consider, and that admit of
a computational description, constitute a distinct, and second-
order set of phenomena. Although not focussed on languaging,
Riley et al. (2011) argue that interpersonal movement coordina-
tion is the result of establishing interpersonal synergies of the
sort described here, and they distinguish between component-
dominant dynamics, as portrayed within a cognitivist framework,
with interaction-dominant dynamics in which the autonomy of
the level of interaction is more thoroughly acknowledged. Finally,
the perceptual crossing paradigm introduced by Auvray et al.
(2009) provides a minimalist experimental set up in which two
people interact in real time in a minimal virtual space. While not
communicative in any conventional sense, the nature of the emer-
gent behavior observed serves to illustrate the principal point
being made that the interaction itself constitutes a level of relative
autonomy that is not reducible to the conjunction of proper-
ties of its components (Froese et al., 2014). These latter two
examples illustrate that social interaction and languaging are not
separate phenomena. Languaging is a constitutive part of the
manner in which interpersonal entrainment or coupling arises in
the moment by moment real time reciprocal interaction among
people.
3.3. VOICE vs. WRITING
Before giving further consideration to the relationship between
subjecthood and voice, it is appropriate to recall the vast chasm
that separates speech from writing, not least as the claim is
made here that most of the phenomena described by modern
linguistics relate, in fact, to the structure of written communi-
cation, and are only indirectly relevant to the act of speaking,
which is the central form in which languaging is manifested
(Linell, 2005). Since the advent of alphabetic writing in Greek
society, a naive view has been available that writing is simply
a device for transcribing speech. Olson (1996, p. 66) identifies
overt statements that express this view from Aristotle, Saussure,
Bloomfield, and more. This is why theories of syntax, morphol-
ogy, and semantics, that together delimit much of that which we
call “language,” allow themselves to study and model the formal
characteristics of symbol strings, without consideration of the
medium of expression. This insensitivity to the enormous differ-
ences between writing and speech underlies the focus by Saussure
on langue rather than parole, and by Chomsky on competence,
rather than performance. With that, modern linguistic theory has
turned its attention away from the most common form of lan-
guaging, indeed the only one that existed from the fuzzy origins
of speech until the relatively recent development of writing and
the even more novel phenomenon of mass textual proliferation.
It has ignored the real time reciprocal interaction among people
giving voice from context-specific situations of concern.
We have now a wealth of research that documents very sub-
stantial changes that arise with the advent of writing, and espe-
cially with the spread of literacy consequent to the development
of printing. These changes affect not only the way language is
used, but the very structure of the consciousness of language users
(Stewart, 2010). Ong (1982) provides an authoritative and com-
prehensive catalog of differences between the way knowledge is
managed, shared, and verbalized in primary oral cultures, and
in highly literate ones. Olson (1996) further documents the pro-
found conceptual and cognitive implications of the spread of
literacy. Much of this work focusses on the novelties that accom-
pany writing and literacy. McLuhan claimed that “writing was an
embalming process that froze language” (McLuhan, 1964), and
he provides an anectode from Prince Modupe, who speaks of his
encounter with the written word in his West African days:
The one crowded space in Father Perry’s house was his book-
shelves. I gradually came to understand that the marks on the
pages were trapped words. Anyone could learn to decipher the sym-
bols and turn the trapped words loose again into speech. The ink
of the print trapped the thoughts; they could no more get away
than a doomboo could get out of a pit. . . (McLuhan, 1964, p. 84).
With writing, texts achieve an independence from their sources. A
spoken utterance is necessarily vouched for by the speaker, while
a written sentence asserts, without the contingency and commit-
ment of a speaker. I have mentioned that voice gives rise to a
subjective pole. Here we can see that the complement is also true:
writing gives rise to a particular kind of objectivity, one in which
for the first time it is possible to have “facts that speak for them-
selves” (Latour, 2013). (For an insightful account of several ways
in which objectivities are constructed, see Daston and Galison,
2007).Written sentences remain immutable and thus support dis-
section and analysis in a way that spoken utterances, which must
be articulated each time they come into being, do not. The further
development of speech and language technologies in the service
of message passing has given rise to forms of spoken langauge,
e.g., in news broadcasts or public service announcements, that
bear greater similarity to written texts than to spoken utterances,
while recent increases in the possibility of text-based reciprocal
exchanges, e.g., in SMSmessaging, further serve to complicate the
relation between voices, texts, messages, and intentions3.
It is interesting in this regard to consider the constraint
observed by Everett to hold in the language of the Pirahã, an
Amazonian tribe whose language is remarkable in its simplic-
ity and omissions, having no counting system, very restricted
tenses, arguably no syntactic recursion, etc. The Pirahã also have
no mythology or stock of fiction. Everett attributes many of
these constraints to what he calls the Immediacy of Experience
Principle, according to which statements by the Pirahã “contain
only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either
3My thanks to the anonymous reviewer who pointed out that the stark
dichotomy between spoken and written texts has become considerably more
complex.
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experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive dur-
ing the lifetime of the speaker” (Everett, 2009a, p. 132). Here, the
strong tie betwen the speaker and the words spoken appears to
have become sedimented into the very structure of the language
and culture, leaving no room for the disembodied words found in
writing. It is perhaps no coincidence that Everett’s observations
have become controversial precisely among those linguists who
hold syntax, and syntactic recursion in particular, to be central to
the very nature of language (Hauser et al., 2002; Everett, 2009b).
4. SPEAKING IN UNISON
The act of speaking in unison is a common form of vocal behavior
that is accorded no particular theoretical significance in a message
passing view of language. On the received view, minds and sub-
jects are closed and singular; thus many people saying the same
thing at the same time appears merely as a multiplication of the
individual speaker. The behavior does seem somewhat perplexing
though, for whatmessage is being passed if we all know the words?
It is worthwhile to consider both the occasions in which people
often speak in unison, and the form of the speech so produced.
“Joint speaking” is an umbrella term I have coined to cover all
occasions in which the same words are uttered by multiple people
in unison (Cummins, 2013a). This includesmany practices of col-
lective prayer, the chants of both protest demonstrators and sports
fans, the recitations of young school children, performances of
choral speech, and the swearing of collective oaths in secular con-
texts. To all these naturally occurring variants we can also add the
simultaneous reading of novel texts by pairs (or more) of speak-
ers in the laboratory in a paradigm known as Synchronous Speech
(Cummins, 2003, 2009).
This brief survey of situations in which people speak in unison
makes it clear that this behavior is very widespread, and is found
in virtually every culture. It is thus a central, and not a periph-
eral, example of languaging. With the exception of joint speaking
in classrooms, which serves a multitude of purposes imposed
by educational authorities rather than expressing any sentiment
of the speakers, all of the naturally occurring forms of joint
speech are found in situations in which the attribution of col-
lective, shared, intentionality seems to straightforwardly capture
the significance of the practice for participants. In prayer con-
texts, collective speaking testifies to shared beliefs. In protest, the
shared purposes of the crowd are made manifest through chant-
ing. Among sports fans, chants are a means by which collective
identity is sustained and asserted. None of this is at all surpris-
ing, nor in need of precise definition—at least, no more precise
than seems warranted for the attribution of beliefs, desires, and
intentions to individuals. While we may not all be enthusiastic
chanters, even a reluctance to join in such behavior testifies to
the obligatory assocation of such voicings with the underlying
sentiments.
But if message passing does not illuminate such behavior, it
seems fair to ask how we might better characterize it; why are
people engaging in such vocal activity, if not to pass ideas around?
While there is probably not a single answer to this question, a use-
ful conceptual approach suggests itself from the theory of speech
acts (Austin, 1975). Austin noted that many utterances achieve
something simply by virtue of being spoken. Examples include
“I pronounce you man and wife,” or “I apologize for my behav-
ior.” Such utterances he called “performatives.” In the treatment
provided by Austin, they are frequently signaled by such verbs as
“pronounce,” “decree,” “promise,” etc. The set of performatives
Austin alludes to, and the associated set of acts performed is very
restricted. If there is merit to the idea that uttering gives rise to
the complementary poles of subject and world, then all utterances
might properly be considered to be performatives, and the estab-
lishment of a transient subject pole with an implicit intentional
structure would then be an achievement of the act of uttering.
This approach to understanding joint speech helps to make sense
of some of its most reliable features. In what follows I will consider
mainly the three most common forms of joint speech4: collective
prayer, protest chanting, and sports chanting.
All three forms of joint speech are frequently, almost
inevitably, characterized by repetition: the same phrase or short
verse is repeated tens, or even hundreds of times over. Repetition
makes sense if the temporally bound act of utterance is required
to establish and maintain a transient subject pole with respect
to which we can identify beliefs or intentions. Repetition is
undergirded by physical actions such as fist pumping, bead twid-
dling, or arm waving. While bead manipulation is relatively
private, the more macroscopic actions further serve to facilitate
synchronization among participants.
Repetition also serves to accentuate and exaggerate the rhyth-
mic properties of utterances, while repetition of a short phrase
can also induce a change in perception from speech to song
(Deutsch et al., 2011). In repeated spoken chants, the form of
speech that arises thus blends seamlessly into the musical domain,
establishing a continuity between speech and music. The close
relation between spoken and sung chant is signaled by the very
ambiguous nature of the word “chant” in English which applies
with equal facility in either domain. It is interesting that a focus on
collective speech makes a continuum between speech and music
appear natural, even obligatory, while the message passing per-
spective as articulated most clearly by Pinker (1999) insists on
an absolute divide between the two domains. On the message-
passing view, speech is an expression of the highly valued notional
faculty of language, and thus central to our human minds, while
music is denigrated as “auditory cheesecake,” with no—from
his perspective—apparent functional significance, thus merit-
ing being grouped together with artistic expression, cheesecake,
and pornography (Pinker, 1999). If anything illustrates the lim-
ited capacity to describe, or even see, that the message passing
perspective induces, surely it is this failure to appreciate the con-
tinuum we are all familiar with that extends from instrumental
music, through song, rap, poetry, rhymes, rhetoric, and chant
(Cummins, 2013a). We might note in passing that the contrast
between the real time participatory nature of the voice that is
here contrasted strongly with the frozen nature of writing finds
a strong parallel in contemporary discussion of the relationship
between live musical performance and recording (Chanan, 1995).
We like to speak of the “wisdom of crowds,” but the rather
more familiar notion of the ignorance of the mob, whose powers
4I hypothesize—I am not sure how one might measure relative frequency
here.
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of reason are not to be trusted, is perhaps more apt for many of
the situations under consideration. While groups have frequently
been found to outperform individuals in tasks of judgment and
estimation (Koriat, 2012), groups involved in joint speech of
protest are often found in volatile situations where collective
actions are rudimentary and aggressive. It is worth noting though
that some degree of sophistication in the beliefs that are jointly
articulated is provided by the formal scaffold of call and response.
The device of having a single leader call a series of questions to
which the crowd provides a series of responses is found in both
prayer and protest, though perhaps less so in sports chants. In
prayer, this sequence of leading call and collective response is
often formalized into liturgical rites, allowing for a great deal of
complexity in the beliefs that are thereby expressed. In protest, it
is far more common to see only a single call, and a single response,
and the very nature of protest mitigates against the kind of codi-
fication found in ritual liturgical practices. Sports chanting seems
to be more concerned with the demonstration of collective iden-
tity than with the formulation of explicit statements of belief or
intention, and call-and-response chants are less common.
If we view writing as an elaboration of some aspects of speak-
ing, i.e., a technological extrapolation that gives rise to a formal
system of the kind studied under the somewhat misleading label
of “language,” then we might observe that vocal behavior, or
languaging, appears to have other extrapolations, other forms
of extension, and other forms of codification, so that the for-
mal constructs of the linguists are not the only descendents of
the voice. Collective speech has found integration into rituals in
a great diversity of traditions. The Abrahamic religions all for-
malize collective speaking within their respective services, and in
each of them the rituals integrate joint speaking into a carefully
orchestrated sequence of complementary acts by service leaders
and participants that include highly stylized sequences of move-
ments such as bowing, kneeling, marching, etc. Other religious
traditions have engaged in similar forms of codification (Bell,
1988). Parallels between linguistic grammar and ritual structure
have previously been noted (Michaels et al., 2010), but the prin-
cipal point argued here is that voice has given rise to more than
one species of formalization. Liturgy and ritual do not admit of
the same generative mutability as freely spoken or written text,
but by codifying such utterances in collective speech and rit-
ual, the implicit intentional structure that arises in speaking and
performing, together with the associated belief structure, is sta-
bilized. With such observations, the boundaries of “language”
become somewhat less determinate, and the subjects that find
voice become both more numerous and more varied.
4.1. DYNAMIC ENTANGLEMENT IN SYNCHRONOUS SPEAKING
If the relation between voice and subjectivity put forward here
has merit, joint speaking appears as an extreme example that can
serve to hone our considerations of the form and nature of col-
lective intentionality. In monolog, I alone dictate the intentional
ground of my utterances; in conversation, the shared ground
is fluid and negotiated; in chanting it is immovable. Are there
then any signatures of joint intentionality that we can observe?
In the spirit of the dynamical coupling hypothesis of Fusaroli
et al. (2014), we might look for evidence that joint speakers
are strongly coupled, giving rise to emergent phenomena at the
supra-individual level.
In a series of behavioral studies in which speakers are asked
to read novel texts in unison, no major differences that would
serve to pick out speech as collective based on its acoustic char-
acteristics alone have been observed (Cummins, 2014). Speech
produced in these constrained laboratory settings is remarkably
unremarkable, and the technique of having subjects speak in
synchrony has been used as a device for obtaining unmarked
speech in several phonetic studies (Krivokapic´, 2007; Kim and
Nam, 2008; O’Dell et al., 2010; Dellwo and Friedrichs, 2012).
The unmarked phonetic structure of speech elicited in the syn-
chronous speaking situation contrasts strongly with the obser-
vation that texts recited in ritual and rite are frequently, if not
inevitably, highly stylized in prosodic form. For example, consider
the typical pattern with which the Hail Mary is said when recit-
ing the rosary, or, in a secular context, the characteristic form of
the Pledge of Allegiance as recited by American schoolchildren.
Prosodic stylization thus appears as a reliable, but not necessary
characteristic of joint speech.
There is one form of speech error found in a synchronous
speech task that seems to be unique to that situation, and that
illustrates a strong dynamic coupling between speakers. When
one speaker makes a speech error, it is frequently, though by
no means always, observed that both speakers stop speaking
simultaneously. Sometimes this abrupt cessation can even be in
mid-syllable. Abrupt and simultaneous cessation of speech seems
to be unique to this situation, and I have previously compared
it to the collective tumbling that happens so readily in a three-
legged race if either participant makes a misstep (Cummins et al.,
2013). This seems to suggest that the task of synchronizing leads
to a close intertwining of the process of speech production by
each speaker, leaving each vulnerable to mistakes by the other.
This observation might be tempered, however, by noting that
the degree of synchronization found in the laboratory is typically
much greater than that found in the wild, where relatively loose
temporal alignment is common and tolerated.
A second source of empirical phenomena associated with joint
speaking comes from an fMRI study by jasmin et al. (in prepara-
tion), in which subjects spoke prepared sentences in a variety of
conditions, including speaking alone, listening, speaking in syn-
chrony with the experimenter and speaking in synchrony with
a recording of the experimenter. Importantly, subjects were not
informed of the difference between the latter two conditions, and
on debriefing, they were never aware that recordings were used at
all. In contrasting the regional blood flow subsequent to speaking
in the latter two synchronization conditions, a marked difference
was found in macroscopic patterns of cortical activity, despite
the obliviousness of subjects to the contrast. In particular, syn-
chronization with a live person was characterized by an increase
in activity in right hemisphere locations, including the tempo-
ral pole, supramarginal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and the
right hemisphere homolog of Broca’s area—the latter three are
areas that, in the left hemisphere, are reliably implicated in speech
production activity. There is thus a large scale alteration to the
well-known hemispheric asymmetry that attends speech produc-
tion, but only when the speaker is coupled in real time to another
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 760 | 7
Cummins Voice and recurrent interaction
speaker, and not when the non-self voice has the inflexibility of a
recording.
5. VOICE, (INTER-)SUBJECTIVITY AND REAL TIME
RECURRENT INTERACTION
As scientists, there is a need to acknowledge that the metaphysical
background within which one works makes some inquiries pos-
sible, and some impossible. For all the acknowledged successes of
the message passing view of language rooted in a Cartesian frame-
work, there are very many familiar phenomena that have been
passed over, or, at best, relegated to the outer wastelands of the
non-cognitive and non-linguistic. I have here sought to work with
a notion of the subject that is an emergent property of specific
kinds of interpersonal interaction rooted in real time reciprocal
exchange. This unconventional view of the subject brings with it a
very different view of what language is, to the point where the sys-
tematic formal system described by modern linguistics no longer
appears to be describing the human capacity to create shared per-
spective, to generate a shared common ground, and to bring forth
a common world. Where received approaches to “language” treat
of regularities found in sequences of symbols, I have focussed on
the voice, uttered from a specific concerned perspective, and nec-
essarily tied to the real time negotiation of a subjective pole. In the
voice, we find a strong index of intentionality, but an intention-
ality that shifts, that arises fluidly, that is sometimes grounded in
an individual, sometimes in a negotiated context, and that some-
times seems to emerge at the collective level in amanner no longer
reducible to the thoughts, beliefs, and perspectives of the con-
tributing individuals (Carr, 1987). This dissociation of the voiced
subject from the solipsistic individual is seen perhaps most clearly
in the case of joint speech. The emphasis on voice and inten-
tionality serves to position the symbolic domain of structural
and generative linguistics as a specific, limited, extrapolation, and
codification of an older practice of uttering that has given rise to
several distinct extensions and codifications in such domains as
ritual and rite.
The loosening of metaphysical commitments that results when
we abandon the Cartesian subject offers the opportunity to recon-
sider many phenomena, and joint speech provides an important
and familiar case in point. The practice of joint speech is not
restricted to any particular culture. As well as being ubiquitous,
it is immediately apparant that the situations in which people
speak collectively do not form an arbitrary or incoherent set.
All such situations seem to provide strong evidence of collec-
tively held beliefs, and it is through the collective voicing that this
attribution becomes warranted. It might help here to note that
the subjectivity being treated so rudely is not coextensive with
the mind of an individual, nor with the idea of a cognitive sys-
tem, conceived of as a set of sub-personal information processing
mechanisms that some hypothesize to underlie observed behav-
ior. The subject pole referred to here is an aggregate to whom it
makes sense to attribute a limited range of intentions, and in par-
ticular, beliefs. I am thus wielding the term “belief” here in a sense
rather like the dispositional account provided by Ryle (1949). This
flexible notion of the subject seems to work when applied to an
individual, a conversing dyad, or a lynch mob, each of whom
can be said to speak from a distinct position, with a specific
perspective. In strenuously avoiding the Cartesian split between
mind and world, we would do well to avoid adopting an overly
rigid metaphysical position. Rather, if subjects admit of the kind
of treatment proposed here, then an ontological lightness of touch
that can encompass many kinds of intentional subjects seems
warranted.
The empirical phenomena described above strongly highlight
the importance of real time dynamic interaction among people
in generating the subject-pole to which beliefs can sensibly
be attributed. The neural signature of collective speaking is
found when speaking with a live speaker, but not with a record-
ing (jasmin et al., in preparation). Live conversational partners
become entangled not only in ways that fit a linguistic description
(lexical priming, syntactic biasing, phonological, and phonetic
imitation, Pickering and Garrod, 2004), but in a host of subtle
ways that have hitherto been treated of as non-linguistic. These
include gaze, posture, gestures, and blinks, but this set might
conceivably be considerably extended as researchers turn their
attention more and more to physiological markers of interaction
(Campbell, 2007; Richardson et al., 2007; Shockley et al., 2009;
Cummins, 2012; Wagner et al., 2014). The voice is an important
part of the means by which a collective perspective is established
and maintained, but it is one among many. The interaction of
voice and gaze may play a particularly strong role in allowing the
protracted sustainment of conditions of joint attention, which
appears as a possible foundation for the shared intentionality
required to ground a human cultural world (Tomasello et al.,
2005)5.
The dynamic entanglement seen in conversation, and in
joint speech, can be empirically described as a form of mutual
coordination, whereby two or more participants display a tran-
sient inter-dependence on many levels (Shockley et al., 2009;
Fusaroli et al., 2014). This third-person account lends itself
well to ethological and experimental observation and mod-
eling. A well-worked mathematical framework for describing
how autonomous systems that interact in real time can give
rise to emergent phenomena at the collective level is available,
e.g., as illustrated by the field of coordination dynamics (Kelso,
1995; Oullier and Kelso, 2009). Social cognitive neuroscience has
recently begun to recognize that nervous systems of interacting
individuals behave quite differently from those of solitary sub-
jects, and often become inter-dependent (Hari and Kujala, 2009;
Babiloni and Astolfi, 2012; Schilbach et al., 2013). This opens up
a vast empirical research agenda for the future.
But the shifting ground of subjectivity that is here espoused
poses challenges for description from a phenomenological or
experiential point of view. Here, the recent concept of participa-
tory sense-making may be of assistance (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009). Participatory sense-making
extrapolates from the basic enactive account that grounds sense-
making (perception/action in the service of the generation of
meaning) in the adaptive interaction of an autonomous agent
with its environment (Froese and Di Paolo, 2011). Building on
5Small wonder then that the appearance of “language” appears utterly myste-
rious from the vantage point of modern linguistics (Hauser et al., 2014). The
discipline has defined its own subject almost out of existence.
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this perspective, participatory sense-making describes how the
moment-to-moment interaction of two subjects gives rise to a
mutuality in their joint sense-making, allowing for the joint
creation of meaning. On this account, the emergent domain con-
stituted by the inter-dependent activities of two or more subjects
warrants treatment as a phenomenological domain in its own
right (Cummins, 2013b). Intersubjectivity then is the enactment
of a novel phenomenological domain in the sustained, real time
coordinated activities of two or more people. There appears to
be a convergence of the theoretical vocabulary and the demands
raised by empirical studies that bodes well for further scientific
work.
A host of open questions relate to the role of clock time and
synchronized behavior. In collective speaking, we observe highly
coordinated action that relies, not on a common external beat or
timekeeper, but on shared knowledge among interactants. Highly
synchronized behavior that is scaffolded by an external beat is
also very common, as in music making, marching, or dancing,
but this kind of collective entrainment does not seem to bring
with it an automatic sense of commitment to underlying beliefs
or intentions. We are all familiar with western school kids danc-
ing happily to the religiously tinged beats of Bob Marley, without
worrying about whether they really subscribe to the tenets of
Rastafarianism.Much work remains to be done in gaining a better
understanding of how collective coordinated behavior gives rise
to collective intentionality, and what the necessary preconditions
for that in the contributing individuals are.
A willingness to countenance subjective poles that are not co-
extensive with the individual person, and that rise and fade in
a dynamic fashion, is incompatible with the grounding assump-
tions of much of conventional psychology. Of course, psychology
itself has grappled since its inception with the boundaries of the
subject (Dewey, 1896). One way of describing the subject mat-
ter of psychology is with reference to the twin poles of experience
and behavior, for which a causal account is sought. This approach
looks out at the world from a subject whose existence, persistence,
and integrity is taken for granted. The approach taken here, and
enabled by the enactive framework more generally, is to reverse
the direction of inquiry, from a view toward experience (whose?)
and behavior (by whom?), and to look instead at the shifting ref-
erents of the personal pronouns “I,” “we,” “you,” etc. It is here that
it becomes apparent that the received view of language will not
serve, any more than the notion of a solipsistic mind. Of course
the contemporary scientific view of language is deeply rooted in a
specific set of psychological commitments, and a view of mind
as information processing, that together gave birth to the cog-
nitivist worldview. Adopting a different stance with respect to
the ground of experience must, it seems, go hand in hand with
a willingness to question the boundaries that have traditionally
served to demarcate the linguistic domain. This opens up the
enticing prospect that we might begin to question, negotiate, and
re-evaluate just what, and who, “we” think “we” are.
In Seeger (2004), an account is provided of the way music and
song are integrated into the lives of the Suyá people of the Amazon
basin. Some songs, the shout songs, are sung from what we might
consider a conventional egocentric perspective. Others are sung
in unison. Of these Seeger notes:
The Suyá men said they sang shout songs for their sisters. . . When
I asked them for whom they sang unison songs, they responded
that they simply sang them. They weren’t for anyone. A man did
not sing a unison song as a brother, lover, or individual. He sang
it as a member of a group, whose identity was partly established
through the song. Thus, they sang for a general audience: the act
of singing was the statement. In some sense, invocations had no
audience at all. . . (Seeger, 2004, p. 83)
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